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 “Legal positivism,” a theory about the nature of law developed over the last two hundred years 
by, among others, Jeremy Bentham, Hans Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart, and Joseph Raz, is often caricatured by its 
jurisprudential opponents, as well as by lawyers and legal scholars not immediately interested in 
jurisprudential inquiry.  “Positivist” too often functions now as an “epithet” in legal discourse, equated 
(wrongly) with “formalism,” the view that judges must apply the law “as written,” regardless of the 
consequences.  Lon Fuller (late of Harvard Law School), whose spectacular confusions may have 
poisoned the minds of a whole generation of law students, even went so far as to suggest that 
“positivism” had something to do with why judges in Nazi Germany did morally abhorrent things!1  
Ronald Dworkin, often viewed as a ‘liberal’ legal philosopher,2 has made a career out of scandalous 
mischaracterizations of the positivist theory of law.3  Writers associated with “Critical Legal Studies”—to 
whom I’ll return below—contributed to the sense that “positivism” was a politically sterile position.   
                                                          
*
 John P. Wilson Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy & Human Values, 
University of Chicago.  Thanks to Eric Engle for the invitation to contribute and for research assistance. 
1
 See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals 4 Harv. L. Rev., 71, 593-629 (Feb., 
1958) and Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law — A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L.Rev. 630–672.  
2
 By American standards, he is certainly a liberal, but by more cosmopolitan standards, he is plainly an 
apologist for welfare-state capitalism. 
3
 For detailed discussion, see my “Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate:  The Methodology Problem in 
Jurisprudence,” reprinted in my Naturalizing Jurisprudence (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007).  For a shorter 
and more polemical account, with citations to many of those who have tried to correct Dworkin’s 
misrepresentations, see my The End of Empire:  Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21
st
 Century, 36 Rutgers L.J. 165 
(2006). 
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I should like to revisit in this short essay the actual theory of law developed by positivist 
philosophers like Bentham, Hart, and Raz, and to make clear why it is, and was, understood by its 
proponents, to be a radical theory of law, one unfriendly to the status quo and anyone, judge or citizen, 
who thinks obedience to the law is paramount.   To be clear, the leading theorists of legal positivism 
thought the theory gave the correct account of the nature of law as a social institution; they did not 
endorse it because of the political conclusions it entailed, and which they supported.  Yet these theorists 
realized that the correct account of the nature of law had radical implications for conventional wisdom 
about law.  We would do well to recapture their wisdom today. 
 Positivist theories of law, if we may put their core idea quite simply, treat law as a human posit:  
some normative command—“Don’t rob banks” or “Don’t go faster than 55 miles per hour”—is a law (or 
legally valid, as I will sometimes say) because of actions taken by human beings.  Laws are not God’s 
commands, they are not handed down from ‘on high’:  they come into being through certain kinds of 
human actions.   Human beings, of course, do and say lots of things; not all of them create “laws.”  But, 
by the same token, there is no reason to think that because human beings have said or done things that 
do create laws that what they have done is good, or sensible, or fair, or just, or ought to command our 
obedience, or even our allegiance.  What the law is in our society is one thing; what it morally ought to 
be, whether we ought to obey it or endorse it, is wholly another.  We would do well not to confuse the 
two, says the positivist; we would do well, for example, not to think that because the U.S. Supreme 
Court says the law is X, that we have any moral obligation to comply with X or to celebrate it or defer to 
it.   Or, as Bentham was concerned to argue, we should never confuse the fact that certain rules were 
duly enacted by Parliament and so constituted “law” with the question whether these laws were any 
good, whether they made most people better off, whether they should be respected or, instead, 
ridiculed and repealed. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1568333
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 That is the simple way of putting the core thought underlying Legal Positivism.  But let us now 
state it a bit more formally.  Law is, in Hart’s famous formulation, “the union of primary and secondary 
rules.”  Primary rules are the rules that tell citizens what they can and cannot do, but a legal system 
requires more:  for it also requires rules by which we can change the rules, adjudicate disputes about 
the rules, and, most importantly, figure out what the rules of our legal system actually are.   The rule 
discharging this latter function Hart dubs “the Rule of Recognition”:  it is the rule that specifies the 
criteria of legal validity, the criteria all other rules must satisfy to count as rules of the legal system.  Of 
course, if the “rule of recognition” is just another rule, like all the others, then the question can naturally 
arise:  how do we know this rule of recognition is the rule of our legal system?  An infinite regress looms. 
But the Rule of Recognition, according to Hart, is a special kind of rule, what he calls a “social 
rule.”  A “social rule” is Hart’s label for a social practice that has two distinguishing characteristics.  A 
“social rule” exists when: first, there is a convergent practice of behavior among a group of people; and 
second, those engaged in the behavior believe themselves to be obligated to engage in that behavior (in 
Hart’s terminology, those engaged in the behavior take an “internal point of view” towards what they 
are doing).   The first criterion—convergent practice of behavior—is characteristic of lots of mindless 
group behavior:  all the children choose chocolate at the ice cream parlor; all the worker ants serve the 
queen ant.  No one thinks the children have an obligation to choose chocolate, it just happens that they 
are in the habit of doing so.  And the worker ants certainly do not think they must protect the queen 
ant; they just do what they do! 
 The Rule of Recognition is different.  To be sure, it involves a convergent practice of behavior:  
judges in the U.S., for example, treat the fact that Congress enacted a piece of legislation (and the 
President signed it) as obligating them to decide issues that come before them in accord with the rules 
in that legislation.   So judges converge on “norms enacted by Congress” as a criterion of legal validity.  
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But judges are not like the kids who habitually choose chocolate or the worker ants serving their queen.  
Judges do not just “mindlessly” happen to treat Congressional enactments as legally binding; rather they 
believe that they have an obligation to treat such enactments as binding.  That is the second crucial 
component for the existence of a social rule in Hart’s sense.  The Rule of Recognition is a social rule, 
which means that for a Rule of Recognition to exist there must be both a convergent practice among 
officials (especially judges) of applying certain criteria of legal validity in deciding which norms are law, 
but also that the officials adopt an “internal point of view” towards this practice, that is, they believe 
they have an obligation to do this. 
 So now we have a much richer account of the sense in which law is a product of human actions:  
a norm is legally valid in some society when it satisfies the criteria of legal validity in that society’s Rule 
of Recognition, and a Rule of Recognition exists in virtue of a complex sociological and psychological 
fact, namely, that certain officials of the system apply those criteria and believe they ought to apply 
them.   Notice that the positivist theory of law does not claim that they are correct to believe that they 
ought to apply those criteria; the theory claims only that when law exists in some society, we find a 
social rule that is the Rule of Recognition.4   This leaves open the possibility—importantly so—that the 
officials of the system are mistaken in thinking they ought to apply the criteria of legal validity they 
actually apply.  That, of course, is what any positivist would have said about judges in Nazi Germany or 
in the “Jim Crow” American South or in Pinochet’s Chile:  to the extent they took themselves to have an 
obligation to apply rules enforcing the second-class status (or worse) of Jews or African-Americans or 
socialists, they had made a moral mistake.  The valid laws of their system were morally reprehensible, 
and warranted disobedience, not enforcement.  But whether Alabama had a legal system in 1950 is a 
                                                          
4
 Confusion on this point accounts for most of the “natural law” criticisms of positivism, from Dworkin 
through John Finnis. 
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separate question from whether it was a good legal system:  no significant legal positivist I can think of 
would have answered the second question in the affirmative. 
 Jeremy Bentham was a radical who thought British moral thinking of the early 19th-century was 
a travesty of trivialities and self-serving nonsense, almost willfully ignoring the plain fact that the 
majority of people were not well-off or happy.  He proposed replacing “morality” (which was 
preoccupied with many topics we would now denominate matters of etiquette) with utilitarianism, 
which would ask whether or not some rule or action actually maximized happiness.  His was a radically 
egalitarian doctrine:  each person counted once in the utilitarian calculus, and not more than once.  The 
happiness of lords and bankers counted for no more than the happiness of paupers and cobblers.  
Bentham thought it important to separate the question, “Is this rule part of the law?” from “Does this 
rule maximize utility?” precisely because he thought the laws of England were largely indefensible and 
required radical overhaul in accordance with utilitarian principles.  Bentham’s radicalism extended, 
famously, beyond the grave:  in order to disabuse his superstitious fellow citizens of their fears about 
dead bodies, he declared in his will that his body should be preserved and put on display, the “Autoicon” 
that exists (in somewhat modified form) to this day. 
 Neither Hart nor Raz is quite the notorious enemy of the status quo that Bentham was, but both 
share with Bentham the progressive impulse and the desire to demystify “law” so that no one thinks the 
judgment, “This is the law” settles the question, “Is this what ought to be done?”  No public intellectual 
did more to bring about the decriminalization of homosexuality in Britain than Hart,5 for example, and 
Raz, a native of Israel, has been a staunch critic of the mistreatment of the Palestinians and other human 
                                                          
5
 H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) at 9, 13-14, 25, 45. Available at: http://books.google.com. 
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rights abuses by Israel.  But the real radicalism of Raz’s view becomes clear only in the technical details 
of his legal and political philosophy.6 
 All law claims the right to tell citizens what it is they must do.  Even the worst legal systems, and 
the stupidest laws, present themselves as authoritative and binding.  If you are stopped by the police for 
speeding, and protest, “But the speed limit is unreasonably low here,” the response by the officer of the 
law will no doubt be abrupt:  “Save your breath, you broke the law.”   Law, as Raz put it, claims 
“authority,” it claims the right to tell its subjects what they must do:  it does not invite them into a 
dialogue about whether the reasons underlying the law are good or sound or sensible, it purports to say, 
this is what must be done, end of the discussion. 
 That may be a characteristic feature of laws and legal systems, but that does not, of course, 
mean any particular legal system is justified in making that claim to authority.  According to Raz’s 
influential account, a claim of authority by the law is only justified when what the law commands its 
subjects to do is close enough to what they really, morally speaking, ought to do and, left to their own 
devices, the subjects would have done worse.  Raz calls it the “Service Conception” of authority, and its 
core idea is simple:  a claim of authority is morally justified when the authority actually performs a 
service for its subjects, helping them really act better than they would without the benefit of the 
authority’s intervention. 
 Think, for a moment, of a parent who tells her child, “You must wear your raincoat today.”  The 
child replies, “Why?  It’s not raining,” even as the first drops fall and the clouds darken.   The parent has 
a justified claim of authority over the child precisely because the child will come closer to what Raz calls 
“right reason”—doing what the child really ought to do (namely, wear a raincoat)—than he would 
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 See generally, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986). 
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without the parent’s intervention.  We can all, I think, agree that parents, in situations like this, have 
justified claims of authority over their children.  But Raz’s suggestion is that a legal system only has a 
justified claim of authority over its subjects when it satisfies the same stringent standard. 
 Legal systems can sometimes meet this standard, for example, when they solve coordination 
problems that afflict any complex society.  Should we drive on the left or the right?  Surely it is a matter 
of moral indifference!  The Brits may drive on the left, but they are not for that reason immoral drivers!  
What matters is that we all do the same thing, that is, that we coordinate our behavior.   The law is 
uniquely situated to effect that outcome:  by telling its subjects to all drive on the right (or the left, as 
the case may be), it can exercise a justified claim of authority over its subjects on the Razian view.  
Sometimes it can also do so when the law brings to bear technical expertise not available to the ordinary 
citizen. 
 But the key point is that, on the Razian view, it almost certainly turns out that most laws, and 
most legal systems, do not have justified claims of authority over their citizens.   Take the legal system in 
the plutocratic United States:  its laws—from its tax system, to its laws regulating business—consistently 
enrich a tiny minority (1-2% of the population) at the expense of the well-being of the vast majority.7   
To be sure, the U.S. legal system claims authority over its subjects, but is it justified in doing so?  The 
Razian answer is almost certainly in the negative, unless we suppose that the vast majority would be 
complicit in their subjugation.8   If that is right, then even though the U.S. legal system claims authority 
over its subjects, that claim is probably not morally defensible.    
                                                          
7
 See, Huffington Post, Income Inequality: Top 400 U.S. Earners See Income Rise 476% In Last 15 Years, 
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/05/income-inequality-top-400_n_487878.html. In the same 
time, median family income increased only 13.2%.   
8
 One must admit the possibility, of course, that the U.S. population has had its cognitive and empathetic 
capacities so damaged by thirty years of reactionary propaganda that, left to its own reasoning, it might well do 
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 The Marxist legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis (later murdered by Stalin), in his classic 1929 work 
on The General Theory of Law and Marxism,9 cautioned that it is a mistake to think a Marxist theory of 
law “should simply throw overboard the basic abstractions which give expression to the fundamental 
essence of the legal form”;10 rather it “must start with an analysis of the legal form in its most abstract 
and pure shape and then work towards the historically concrete”.11  When we understand law and its 
claimed authority in the manner of Hart and Raz, we immediately open up the possibility that the 
concrete instantiations of laws and legal systems are unjust and have no claim on our allegiance or 
obedience.  The possibility of radical critique of law, as Pashukanis understood, turns on our ability to 
identify its essential characteristics precisely so we can then subject its concrete instantiations to 
skeptical assessment.  
 There has, alas, never been a serious school of Marxist criticism of legal institutions in American 
law schools.  The closest we have come in the reactionary political culture of the United States over the 
last thirty years was the “Critical Legal Studies” movement (hereafter CLS) associated with such minor 
and philosophical insubstantial theorists as Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger of the Harvard Law 
School.  From the standpoint of a Pashukanis, or any Marxian theory of law and society, the rise of CLS in 
the 1970s and 1980s—coinciding, as it did, with the rise of the free-market ideology of the “law and 
economics” movement—is fraught with ironies.   For with some exceptions, 12  CLS simply revived a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
worse.  That, of course, was the nightmare scenario imagined by the Frankfurt School a half-century ago, but we 
may still hope that most people would, e.g., recognize the moral importance of taxing the estates of the wealthy. 
9
 Trans. by Barbara Einhorn (Worcester:  Pluto Publishing, 1989).   
10
 Id. at 49. 
11
 Id. at 95. 
12
 Closer to the spirit of Marx are the critiques of the American legal system in CLS-associated writers like Richard 
Abel and Karl Klare, who emphasize the extent to which the explicit ideals of the law (e.g., in torts and labor law) 
fall far short of the reality of the practice. See their contribution to David Kairys (ed.), The Politics of Law: A 
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strategy of left-wing critique that dates back to the Left Young Hegelians of the 1830's in Germany.  
Seizing upon the Hegelian notion that ideas are the engine of historical change, the Left Hegelians 
sought to effect change by demonstrating that the prevailing conservative ideas were inherently 
contradictory and thus unstable.  To resolve these contradictions, it would be necessary to change our 
ideas, and thus change the world. 
 This strand of Hegelianism was a dead issue by the 1850's--in part because of Schopenhauer's 
devastating anti-Hegelian polemics, in part because of Marx's criticisms (about which more below), and 
in part because of the more general "materialistic" and "positivistic" turn in German intellectual life 
associated with Feuerbach and the so-called "German Materialists."13  It was not revived until 1922 
when Georg Lukács re-introduced Left Hegelian themes into the Marxist tradition of social critique in 
History and Class Consciousness, especially in the central chapter on "The Antinomies of Bourgeois 
Thought."  CLS, however, acquires the style of argument not directly from Lukács--though he was a 
favorite figure in the footnotes of CLS articles--but from CLS "founding father" Roberto Unger, whose 
1975 book Knowledge and Politics quite obviously recapitulates the central arguments and themes of 
History and Class Consciousness. 
 The irony, of which most CLS writers seem little aware, is that CLS should have revived precisely 
the tradition in left-wing thought that Marx had so viciously lampooned 150 years earlier!14  Indeed, 
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with certain obvious emendations, we find Marx and Engels articulating the kind of critique that 
accounts for why CLS is now moribund:  
Since [the Crits] consider conceptions, thoughts, ideas, in fact all the products of 
consciousness...as the real chains of men...it is evident that [the Crits] have to fight only 
against these illusions of the consciousness.  Since, according to their fantasy, the relationships 
of men, all their doings, their chains and their limitations are products of their consciousness, 
[the Crits] logically put to men the moral postulate of exchanging their present consciousness 
for human, critical or egoistic consciousness, and thus of removing their limitations.  This 
demand to change consciousness amounts to a demand to interpret reality in another way, 
i.e., to recognize it by means of another interpretation....They forget, however, that to these 
phrases [constituting the old interpretation] they are only opposing other phrases, and that 
they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the 
phrases of this world. 
Showing the right-wing professors that their ideas are incoherent and demanding that they change their 
ideas is politically irrelevant for Marx:  it is, of course, "contradictions" in the material circumstances of 
life that are the real engine of historical change.  What CLS did was to revive precisely this discredited 
strand of critical theory--the critique of ideas or "consciousness"--in the legal domain.  That the right-
wing ideology of “law and economics” triumphed in American law schools at the very same time as CLS 
mounted its critique is surely rather good evidence that this strategy of critique is no more relevant now 
than it was in 1840. 
 Unfortunately, the flirtation with CLS’s revival of Left Hegelianism disabled an entire generation 
of legal theorists who might have benefitted from the clarity of thinking about law characteristic of legal 
positivism.  To be sure, we should not imagine that a generation of clear-eyed legal positivists would 
have defeated the many reactionary developments in American law over the last thirty years.   The 
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material circumstances in which we live continue to dictate the major legal and political developments.  
But as Marx also understood, there come historical moments when intellectual clarity about social 
reality is indispensable for political action.15   One part of that social reality is law, and positivism 
remains the theory that supplies the requisite clarity.  Much more is needed, of course, than a realistic 
picture of the nature of law, but that hardly alters the fact that positivism lays the conceptual 
foundation for any radical critique of law in late capitalist societies. 
                                                          
15
 See the discussion of Marx in my “The Heremenutics of Suspicion:  Recovering Marx, Nietzsche,a nd 
Freud,” in The Future for Philosophy, ed. B. Leiter (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 2004). 
